previously reported (Bamford et al., 2004) , the induction of dopamine release in control animals acted as a low-pass filter, producing frequency-dependent decreases in glutamate release at less active terminals. In stark contrast, animals with a drug history exhibited accelerated and renormalized glutamate release from the most active corticostriatal terminals following drug readministration, thereby disrupting normal filtering mechanisms. However, this alteration was not produced by a change in drug-induced dopamine release, which remained normal following repeated methamphetamine exposure. Rather, this ''paradoxical presynaptic potentiation,'' or PPP, occurred via stimulation of both dopamine D1 receptors and nAchRs, as it was blocked by either D1 or nAchR receptor antagonism and could be mimicked by both D1 and nAchR receptor agonists.
Collectively, these findings demonstrate that repeated psychostimulant administration produces a robust and long-lasting decrease in corticostriatal glutamate release that is reversed by re-exposure to methamphetamine. These results are largely consistent with reports that drug experience produces decreases in glutamate levels and long-term depression at MSNs within the ventral striatum (McFarland et al., 2003; Thomas et al., 2001) . Thus, drug-induced corticostriatal depression may not be unique to the dorsolateral striatum. However, a number of separate mechanisms for plasticity have been observed at corticostriatal synapses (Kauer and Malenka, 2007) . It is not clear whether CPD and PPP influence this plasticity or how these alterations may work together to produce intractable and compulsive behaviors characteristic of drug addiction. Indeed, as this report only examined corticostriatal exocytosis following experimenter-administered methamphetamine, precisely how drug-induced corticostriatal depression emerges and interacts with learning-related alterations during drug self-administration (Carelli and Wightman, 2004; Phillips et al., 2003) is a question for open discussion and research. One possibility is that CPD and PPP disrupt normal filtering mechanisms of corticostriatal information flow critical for learning, leading to aberrant reward processing and action selection. If so, the discovery of methods to reverse this plasticity may be a promising avenue for addiction treatment.
When distracters conflict with our instructions, our reactions normally get slower. However, Coulthard and colleagues in this issue of Neuron show that damage to the right parietal lobe reverses this effect, paradoxically facilitating responses. This surprising result may shed light on the functional role of parietal cortex within a larger cortical circuit for voluntary behavior.
Functional interpretation of the posterior parietal cortex (PPC) has been notoriously challenging. Despite decades of research using a variety of approaches including single-unit recording, functional imaging, lesion studies, and transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), a unified view of PPC function has not yet emerged. PPC is clearly involved in many kinds of spatial attention (Colby and Goldberg, 1999; Rushworth et al., 1997) , but it has also been implicated in sensorimotor control (Desmurget et al., 1999; Milner and Goodale, 1995; Snyder et al., 2000) and cognitive functions such as decision-making (Glimcher, 2003) . While such a multiplicity of function may perhaps be expected from a region as large and diverse as the PPC, sensory, motor, attentional, and decision processes seem to coexist even within specific subregions such as the lateral intraparietal area (Colby and Goldberg, 1999; Glimcher, 2003; Snyder et al., 2000) .
One attempt to interpret these apparently conflicting results is to view them all as aspects of a process of selection between potential actions (Cisek, 2007; Glimcher, 2003; Gold and Shadlen, 2007) . PPC is part of the ''dorsal visual stream'' (Milner and Goodale, 1995) , which is involved in transforming sensory information into signals for guiding movement (Snyder et al., 2000) . Because the world continuously presents us with multiple opportunities for action, it makes sense for the brain to perform sensorimotor transformations in parallel for several candidate actions. However, since only one action can ultimately be performed by a given effector, it also makes sense that action representations should compete against each other. It has been suggested that the phenomenon of selective attention may serve a role in action selection by enhancing one source of sensory information while suppressing others (Allport, 1987) . In fact, the biased competition model of visual attention (Desimone and Duncan, 1995) is similar to proposed mechanisms for action selection (Cisek, 2007; Usher and McClelland, 2001 ), suggesting that both attention and decision making may serve similar pragmatic roles of implementing a competition between actions. Might this competition occur in the parietal cortex?
In this issue of Neuron, Coulthard et al. (2008) present evidence consistent with the view of PPC as a locus of competition between actions. In their study, these authors employed the well-known Eriksen flanker task, in which subjects are asked to respond to a central cue while ignoring adjacent distracters. In the particular task of Coulthard et al. (2008) , subjects moved a joystick either left or right in response to a central cue pointing either left or right. In some trials (''congruent''), the cue was presented along with symbols that pointed in the same direction. In other trials (''incongruent''), the cue was flanked by symbols pointing in the opposite direction. Finally, in ''neutral'' trials, the cue was flanked by nondirectional stimuli. It is well-known that during such a task, subjects tend to show longer reaction times (RT) in the incongruent trials than in the congruent or neutral trials. A classic explanation is that the incongruent task creates a conflict between two potential responses, one to the right and one to the left, and that it takes some time for the brain to suppress the wrong direction before preparing and releasing the correct one. Coulthard et al. (2008) replicated this classic finding in normal subjects. However, they also report a very striking and counterintuitive result: that subjects with right parietal lesions (in particular, subjects who exhibit symptoms of neglect) show a paradoxical facilitation of responses in the incongruent trials. In other words, their reactions during the incongruent trials are actually faster than during neutral or congruent trials, in striking contrast to all other studies employing the flanker task. This result is seen only for responses toward the right; responses to the left show the classic increased RT in incongruent trials.
What might explain this remarkable finding? Coulthard et al. (2008) suggest that when normal subjects are presented with incongruent trials, both response alternatives are represented in their PPC and compete against each other through mutual inhibition. Because it takes time to resolve this competition, reaction times are slower in the incongruent trials. However, in neglect subjects with damage to the right PPC, leftward responses are much weaker, and thus do not inhibit rightward responses. This accounts for the absence of a reaction time cost in incongruent trials, but it does not explain why rightward responses are faster in the incongruent trials than in neutral or congruent trials. Coulthard et al. (2008) suggest that this paradoxical result implicates a frontal system, intact in the PPC patients, which operates in parallel with the parietal cortex.
The explanation is illustrated in their Figure S8 , reproduced here (Figure 1 ). The top panel shows the neutral condition in which the flankers do not induce any response conflict. Only a single response is prepared (blue line), causing growth of activity toward a threshold (diagram on right), a classic model of response initiation (Hanes and Schall, 1996) . Panel B suggests what happens in normal subjects during incongruent trials. Because of the central cue and incongruent flankers, the intact PPC (red) automatically activates competing motor plans which mutually inhibit each other. This causes reduced activity and a slower growth toward the initiation threshold (red line on the right). Thus, the reaction time is delayed. However, in normal subjects, frontal brain regions selectively enhance the response to the central cue while inhibiting the competing response, helping to accelerate conflict resolution and reduce the time cost of incongruent trials (green line). Thus, RTs in the incongruent trials are still longer than in neutral trials, but not by as much as they would be if frontal regions did not contribute.
Now, consider what this scheme predicts for the parietal neglect subjects. Because the right PPC is damaged, the left-pointing flankers do not induce the automatic activation of a leftward response, and thus the normal cost of incongruent trials is absent. However, frontal regions are still intact and still contribute to the enhancement of the rightward response. Thus, these subjects show a net facilitation of rightward responses in the incongruent trials (green). The suggestion of a separate frontal system, which operates even in the absence of an intact PPC, is consistent with a variety of anatomical studies. Visual information processed in the ventral visual system has projections to ventrolateral prefrontal regions which code behavioral significance (Sakagami and Pan, 2007) , and these pathways are presumably unaffected by parietal damage.
This scheme predicts that in contrast to parietal lesions, lesions of the frontal cortex will cause a slowing of responses in all trials and an increased RT cost of incongruent flankers. This is because the conflict between responses will still exist in PPC, but the enhancement of correct response and suppression of response to flankers will be absent. Indeed, that is what Coulthard et al. (2008) observed in a group of patients suffering from lesions in the insular and inferior frontal white matter.
In summary, the results of the comparison between normal subjects, parietal neglect patients, and patients with frontal lesions support the view that two processing streams simultaneously process visual information in the flanker task. A dorsal visual stream (Milner and Goodale, 1995) produces competing representations of potential responses in PPC, while a ventrolateral frontal system uses ventral visual stream information to selectively enhance correct responses and suppress incorrect ones. A number of issues remain unresolved, of course. For example, why does the effect occur only for rightward responses and only for right PPC lesions? Why do left PPC patients not exhibit facilitation of leftward actions? How does this phenomenon fit with other proposed roles for PPC, such as updating of ongoing actions (Desmurget et al., 1999) and ''motor attention'' in left PPC (Rushworth et al., 1997) ? Unraveling these and the multitude of other intriguing mysteries of human parietal cortex will certainly challenge the simplified hypothesis of action competition. Hopefully, future studies will lead to a richer view of not only the parietal cortex, but of the larger cortical and subcortical circuits that implement voluntary behavior.
